Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 13
Number 4 Vol. 13, No. 4 Climate Change
and Global Security

Article 10

Zombie Experts and Anarchy Imaginaries: Fantasies of 'Crises to
Be' in Climate Change Futures
Natalie D. Baker
Sam Houston State University, natalie.baker@shsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 141-155
Recommended Citation

Baker, Natalie D.. "Zombie Experts and Anarchy Imaginaries: Fantasies of
'Crises to Be' in Climate Change Futures." Journal of Strategic Security 13,
no. 4 (2020) : 141-155.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1867
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/10
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Zombie Experts and Anarchy Imaginaries: Fantasies of 'Crises
to Be' in Climate Change Futures
Abstract
The characterization of human social response in crisis is most often apocalyptic and
dystopic, especially when connected to environmental detriments expected from climate
change. This article draws on the cases of zombie apocalypse experts and climate-fiction to
situate an investigation into how diametric forms of knowledge compete, dominate, and
then replicate in mediated popular culture as forms of truth. It builds on extensive work in
areas of both lived disaster response and mythologies. The article links certain philosophies
to popular culture as a driver in the construction of knowledge and truth. Here, Foucault
and his conceptions of power and knowledge are used as epistemological lenses. The
article also theorizes about the role of societal boredom that explains the power of fantasy
over empirical science. Another goal of the article is to articulate the implications of this
work on practical issues connected to climate change and human security. Mainly, the
article argues the perpetuation of anarchy fantasies can foster and justify policies oriented
towards social control.
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Introduction
“Disorder, chaos, anarchy. Now that’s fun.”1
Human response to crisis is believed chaotic and anarchic.2 Social panic is
assumed in the institutional management of crisis and disasters.3 The
belief looting was common during Hurricane Katrina, for example, evoked
responses intended to re-establish order among lawless citizenry.4
Similarly, climate change security challenges consist of expected problems
ranging from riots, terrorism, pandemics, war, to the more extreme of
man's existential termination.5 Climate change, as a collection of future
terrors to be, re-writes apocalypse narratives that have pervaded human
history.6 In the interstices of future horrors rests an assumption of
Hobbesian wickedness inherent to human nature, cast as universally
selfish and brutal.7
However, anarchy or social chaos, as a definitive feature of behavior in
crisis, does not happen in practice. People tend to be prosocial, altruistic,
self-organizing and chaos adverse. A multitude of events demonstrates, as
stories of mass boat rescues by ordinary citizens during Hurricane Harvey
in Houston, Texas are only one example.8 The 9-11 boatlift had over
500,000 people in 9 hours transported off the island of Manhattan by an
improvised flotilla of mostly citizen boaters is another instance.9 Decades
of research pointing towards similar examples in practice, primarily in
disaster studies, suggests anarchy is uncommon, and perhaps,
nonexistent. 10 Thus, tensions exist between knowledge in practice.
Observed human behavior seems to bear little, if any, weight with both lay
publics and policy makers in this case.11 House Bill 1177 in Texas
demonstrates. This law permits unlicensed gun owners the legal right to
carry for up to 168 hours after a disaster declaration.12 Its justification
comes largely from the belief looters and evildoers prevail in times of
disaster. Again, this is relatively uncommon.
Future calamities of climate change evoke similar imaginations of social
chaos. Crises and catastrophes, as much as it happens in life, are
narratives and imaginaries comprised of “symbols, emblematic images,
stories, legends, myths, or powerful icons shared by a given discursive
community.”13 Narratives are ways people organize social experiences that
imbed into collective memory through mass replication.14 Stories make
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causal inferences about social phenomena, irrespective of whether a
narrative represents an actual truth.15 The catastrophic, as a narrative,
situates in the future. Crises arouse imaginations of possibilities vastly
distinct from a predictable normalcy of the now.16 Fantasies of social chaos
feed into and help reproduce these sensational master-narratives of crises.
These can then dominate less evocative forms of knowledge like science
and facts, whereby spectacular violence is debunked.17
Narratives and imaginaries take on life as replicated in modern
technologic communication systems.18 Popular culture is one way this
happens as it functions to transmit stories that shape how people come to
know about social reality. While its ostensive function is to entertain, pop
culture also serves to replicate narratives within large sociocommunicative systems that have incredible reach. In this sense,
narratives are much more than just entertainment. 19 The overarching
function of popular culture is thus narrative production, which constructs
social identity and frame rationales for past and future actions.20 Popular
culture is both a force of crises representation, and knowledge production.
Here, mediated popular culture is the, “everyday objects, actions, and
events we experience through a media channel such as movies, TV
programs, songs, comic strips, and advertisements that may influence us
to believe and behave in certain ways.”21
Projections of truths about social behavior are replicated in mass mediated
communication systems. These representations can supplant authoritative
voices of knowledge, such as those within the realm of science. Truth is
messy in practice. 22 Foucault explains:
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of
multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of
truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying
what counts as true.23
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Foucault's perspective, therefore, articulates how certain forms of
knowledge dominate others.
Power is an essential component of knowledge production in the view of
Foucault. However, it is not held by individuals or entities; power does not
live as a polemic. Rather, it is “exercised in networks, and individuals do
not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both
submit and exercise this power.”24 Alternatively, as Foucault explains:
…the way in which power operates through the construction of
particular ‘knowledges’ and argued that it is through discourse that
power/knowledge is realised. Conceptions of truth and knowledge
are fundamentally products of power. This combination of
power/knowledge and the embedding of reason diffuses through
the social body producing what people are and what they can do,
structuring the ways things are thought about, how people see
themselves and others, and how they relate to the world around
them.25
The article explores how anarchy narratives of crises seem to resonate
more than those that advance altruism and collective action as truth.
Examined here, are how narratives of social chaos prevail over those of
altruism and social order recreation in crises, using 'regimes of truth' as
articulated by Foucault.26.
Two specific cases exemplify how crises are articulated and understood, by
general audiences. The first is the example of a zombie apocalypse
fictionist, now held as an expert in crisis response. Max Brooks, writer of
World War Z, shows how fiction transforms into authoritative knowledge
on human behavior, without any form of scientific legitimation. Cli-Fi is
the second case.27 This genre of fiction is representative of expected social
behavior in calamities associated with climate change.28 With roots in
books written in the 1960s by J.G. Ballard, modern, archetypal versions of
the genre are exemplified in films such as “Waterworld” and “The Day
After Tomorrow.”29 Cli-Fi paints humanity in dystopic tones–the genre
repeatedly reiterates visions of human behavior as anarchic in times of
great upheaval.30 Ultimately, these two cases help articulate how and why
popular understanding of human social response to crises has displaced
empirical knowledge. In this sense, fiction is perhaps, more compelling
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than the stories about human behavior told within social science.31 The
final argument is that social chaos as spectacle evokes emotions of
excitement that mitigate a deep sense of societal boredom.

Zombie Experts and the Climate Apocalypse
Both cases use illustrative examples to present the implications for human
action that occur when fictional ways of truth production are deemphasized. The cases reflect versions of knowledge that strongly
influence how crises are imagined. These are contrasted with multiple
empirical studies that dually explore lived disaster response, and their
mythologies.32 Foucault's regimes of truth are used an epistemological
frame. Ultimately, the article addresses what is possible in the
advancement of alternative perspectives. 33
The Zombie Apocalypse Expert
Zombies are unique in genre literature in emphasizing the
breakdown of modern society in the wake of an external threat. In
propagating this narrative, constant references to the zombie canon
can reinforce an apocalyptic perception about the future of modern
society, as interest groups also appropriate and exploit the zombie
narrative to pursue their own political agendas, their millenarian
rhetoric helps to lay the groundwork for the societal breakdown
that they claim to fear.34
The story of Max Brooks embodies the quote above. Brooks, the son of
famed comedian and film director Mel Brooks and actress Anne Bancroft,
is a fiction novelist. He is famous for World War Z, a popular novel about
a zombie apocalypse, made into a Hollywood film starring Brad Pitt. His
most recent book is about the murderous shenanigans of Sasquatch. While
he does not have formal training in crisis response or preparedness,
Brooks has earned fellowship status at both West Point’s Modern War
Institute and the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center for Strategy
and Security because his fictions seem to resonate strongly with officials
and policymakers. He is a living demonstration of how fantasy is advanced
as expert knowledge. A description from West Point follows:
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Brooks’ ultimate goal was to challenge old ways of thinking and
encourage mental agility and flexibility for problem solvers and
leaders. Brooks’ unique, unconventional thinking depicted in his
books has even inspired the U.S. military to examine how they may
respond to potential crises in the future. World War Z was read and
discussed by the sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Brooks
has been invited to speak at a variety of military engagements—
from the Naval War College, to the FEMA hurricane drill at San
Antonio, to the nuclear “Vibrant Response” wargame.35
His position as expert gained even more legitimacy when a wealth of
media outlets asked him for preparedness advice in the initial stages of the
SARS-CoV-2 outbreak.36 Brooks offered the following insight into what to
expect regarding panic amongst people in the initial stages of the
coronavirus situation:
Unfortunately, that [mass panic] happens in many crises. People
lose their minds and they do irrational things and they hurt each
other. You don’t want that to happen. You’ve got to make sure you
keep your head when things appear dark all around you. Because,
number one, you can’t fix the problem if you’re too busy losing your
mind.37
Brooks' sentiments do not challenge the predominant beliefs of the status
quo; rather, he provides validity to social chaos narratives of crises. Brooks
builds off the main premise of his fiction novels in the advice he offers in
the real-world context – bringing fiction into reality. The expertise offered
with respect to the pandemic echo his writings of World War Z and the
Great Panic:
It wasn’t a surprise, the war…or emergency, or whatever you want
to call it was already on. It had been, what, three months since
everyone jumped on the panic, train. You remember what it was
like, people just freaking out…boarding up their houses, stealing
food, guns, shooting everything that moved. They probably killed
more people, the Rambos and the runaway fires, and the traffic
accidents and just the whole shit storm that we now call “the Great
Panic”; I think that killed more people at first.”38
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Max Brooks sets an example of how chaos fantasies replicate in popular
culture and become legitimate knowledge. His claims to truth extend to
future responses depicted as apocalyptic, panicky, and anarchic.39 Cli-Fi
operates in a similar manner.
Cli-Fi
The orientation of films that deal with the dooms of an impending climate
future are horrifically dystopic. Hollywood tends to envision an “a lone
hero saving the world from apocalypse” in Cli-Fi movies.40 This is an
archetype in the movies “Waterworld” and “The Day After Tomorrow,”
and were the first cinematic portrayals of climate change. The films
reached mass audiences as highly popular representations of climate
catastrophes outside of novels. These movies paint a picture of sudden
mass destruction:
In contrast to balanced news reports and documentaries, the
fictional Hollywood blockbuster presents a more extreme and
fantasy-led view of a worst-case scenario and beyond. The “what
ifs” of an intangible yet dangerous climate shift are replaced with
deadly storm surges and iconic images such as the Statue of Liberty
engulfed by ice.41
Rapid onset of climate change effects in popular Cli-Fi films were lifted
from the 1983 movie “The Day After,” which was about nuclear winter.42
Much of the genre directly replicates the imagery of dystopian landscapes
within the annihilation of atomic destruction. One example is that of “The
Road” which falls within literary and cinematic Cli-Fi, also widely
distributed among audiences. The description of the book paints such a
picture:
A father and his son walk alone through burned America. Nothing
moves in the ravaged landscape save the ash on the wind. It is cold
enough to crack stones, and when the snow falls it is gray. The sky
is dark. Their destination is the coast, although they don’t know
what, if anything, awaits them there. They have nothing; just a
pistol to defend themselves against the lawless bands that stalk the
road, the clothes they are wearing, a cart of scavenged food—and
each other. The Road is the profoundly moving story of a journey. It
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boldly imagines a future in which no hope remains, but in which the
father and his son, “each the other’s world entire,” are sustained by
love. Awesome in the totality of its vision, it is an unflinching
meditation on the worst and the best that we are capable of:
Ultimate destructiveness, desperate tenacity, and the tenderness
that keeps two people alive in the face of total devastation. 43
The movie casts a similar vision of reality. Here, the man and son must
work together and evade a relentless cast of cannibalistic, marauding
nomads that pepper doom-riddled settings and constantly threaten them.
How and why regular people would turn to eating the flesh of humans,
whereas the nameless man and his child would not, rests in the web of the
spectacle created in post-apocalyptic fiction implies something about the
inherent darkness of human nature.
A fundamental consideration with respect to the concerns of climate
change often both depicted in film are issues of human security. This
especially true with regards to so called ‘hot zones’ of crises –areas subject
to extreme outcomes of climate change. These are deemed the most
vulnerable sites of concern. In Cli-Fi, these are the areas of conflict or in
larger discourses of climate change study – sources of human insecurity
Environmental degradation and the resulting scarcity of resources
are understood as an additional and novel driver for conflicts.
Taken together, these ideas constitute a discourse in which ‘the
vulnerable are becoming dangerous’–that is, a threat for national
security in the Western world or even for international security. The
vulnerable thus become dangerous enemies in the sense of the logic
of security. And this clearly implies a preemptive logic and the
exceptional measures of interstate conflict and military
intervention.44
Similar social panic, anarchy narratives haunt certain segments of society.
Again, during Hurricane Katrina, mass looting, and roving gang myths
effectively shifted the disaster response from rescue to that ‘shoot to kill’
orders perpetrated mostly among Black residents of New Orleans.45 These
orders built only on looting mythologies, not how people behaved in the
response context.
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There remains the question of why narratives persist, and what draws
people in rather than the facts of science that demonstrate the propensity
for human social organization? One possible answer is, the prospect of
danger amid possible crises presents an alleviation from the boredom of
everyday life not easily overcome by facts, science, and stories of altruism.
Mythologies provide escape and is their power. Narratives can override
other ways of knowing, commonly viewed as more legitimate than fiction.
There are implications, however, in the influence on action and policy.

“Disorder, Chaos, Anarchy—Now That’s Fun”
“Historically, audiences love a good natural disaster, and not just
because it’s fun to watch the world’s landmarks crumble, but also
because these films reflect the times we’re living in.”46
The anarchism crises seem to unleash justifies practices and policies
designed for social control. Reasoning rests on misunderstandings about
human behavior, as previously mentioned. These assumptions extend to
visions of climate catastrophes in terms of mass enactments of human
social behavior.47 As such, “Today, the terminology of ‘catastrophic events’
has become widely used in relation to an array of potentially threats –
from climate change to terrorism and global pandemics – and intervenes
in a field of power struggles in which expert knowledge and authorities of
governance must recalibrate and redeploy.”48 This can engender a sense of
futility, but also excitement. Dystopic visions of climate crises where
society is shattered presents the possibility for drastic change away from
the mundanity of the normal.49 Given, what is a possible explanation for
how one version of a social reality body of knowledge and truth comes to
dominate the other?
Modern boredom (or ennui modern) as Gustave Flaubert1 describes, has
two central assumptions and works as a thinkable answer to the question
above. The first is situational, or the familiar experience of boredom,
which is simply a desire for something. For example, when someone says
they are bored. The second form is existential – and is more profound.
Existential boredom concerns a yearning for any desire at all and
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according to Flaubert, describes the totality of the modern condition. Lars
Svendsen, another philosopher, argues that such existential boredom
arises from a circumstance of advantage – or perhaps even laziness where a yearning for the entertainment of anarchy and societal violence
provides a sense of meaning for people.50 The shocking is what compels
one out of the monotony of everyday life outside of what is achieved within
normalcy. An antidote to this boredom is the prospect of societal violence
not just as viewership, but also as achievable. The prospect of crises always
on the edge of the horizon – of social chaos as a truism in disasters that
could well happen helps, for a moment, extinguish that existential
boredom.
These points on boredom clash with an ideal state of security and safety
institutions hope to achieve in advance of disorder expected in the climate
change future. In 1995, James Der Derian argued the “widespread,
metaphysical belief” in the cruciality a security state.51 Similarly, Lene
Hansen points out, “Security has now entered the realm of hyperreality it
does not refer to anything real but is part of a self-referring system, which
is perceived as more real than reality.”52 Security, in the face of the
unknown, is a fundamental human need. This neglects an opposition that
we can truly also truly live within the spaces of fear, ambiguity, and
confusion. Security is a performance of control. At the same time, the
eternal prospect for danger and its analogues justifies the perpetuated
illusion of security. This recursive relationship must continue to exist
recursively for security to persist.
A need for perverse stories that seek to entertainment, but also function as
forms of truth with respect to human behavior in the worst of times,
suggests troubling aspects of the State. Simone Weil’s concept of
uprootedness is relevant here.53 She argued that civilization is a disrupted
state of being (le déracinement) defined by a great sense of alienation and
unrestrained out-of-placeness within ravages of modernity. The extent and
urgency of climate change is a perfect example of a major consequence of
uprootedness. For Weil, the structure and function of the modern State is
one of domination. The imposition of hierarchical systems of power has
reached an apex where “money and the State have come to replace all
other bonds of attachment.”54 An inability to advance stories of altruism
over dystopia, or to choose violent entertainment as representative of
factual reality, demonstrates some major sociocultural problems built on
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the convergence of our past with the present and injected into the visions
of the future.
This article argues that at least part of the issue is a societal obsession with
safety and security in conflict with a preoccupation and desire for, to some
extent, the social destruction of crises. There is wisdom in what Simone
Weil wrote in France in the 1940s,
Risk is an essential need of the soul. The absence of risk produces a
type of boredom which paralyses in a different way from that of
fear, but almost as much. Moreover, there are certain situations
which, involving as they do a diffused anguish without any clearly
defined risks, spread the two kinds of disease at once.55
While risk is one essential need, for Weil another one is that of social
order. Human behavior, as self-organizing and altruistic, not anarchic, in
the context of crises, demonstrates that thing.

Policy Implications
The modern disaster movie was born in the 1970s when public
opinion about institutions was at a low point. Vietnam and
Watergate laid bare the follies of those in power, and movies
reflected a distrust in those who have been tasked to protect their
citizens. The Towering Inferno, The Poseidon Adventure,
and Earthquake all depict a situation pointing to the
resourcefulness of individuals while exposing the flaws of those in
charge. Powerlessness is a thread running throughout these films
whether the disaster at the heart of the story is man-made or
natural in origin. Contingency plans are vital and, without them, the
loss of life is far greater than it should have been if experts had been
listened to.56
There are potential policy implications from the perspectives offered in the
article. Namely, the possibilities of just policies in the advancement of
alternative knowledge forms over fantasy are underscored. Different ways
of understanding human response to the future shocks of climate change
occurs in both science as well as fictions. In this case, scientific, or
empirical knowledge is a marginalized alternative to anarchy fantasies of
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crises. The former points towards social behavior as more of a struggle to
re-establish order through collective acts of altruism and helping than
chaos.57
The article makes explicit, how fantasies can become truth and inform
lived reality in multiple ways. Distancing from the different, competing
versions of truth, however, it is reasonable to expect human response to
social disruptions of future of climate disaster would take on similar
characteristics as those empirically documented. Anarchy fictions, as just
that, but as accepted fact in the politics of catastrophe could be
detrimental to the creation of empirically rooted policy solutions, as seen
in laws such as Texas' HB1177, or in the overall response to Hurricane
Katrina. The perpetuation of these imaginations can foster policies
oriented towards social control. There is power in the amplification of
fantasy as truth, where spectacle has come to organize human action and
legitimate domination.
Resistance to spectacle depends on the extent of its power. Anarchy
fictions are intoxicating to the point that fictionists become authoritative
masters of knowledge about behavior in the sense there is perceived
validity. Political participation is one way to overcome the power of the
spectacle. Action is organized within the interstitial spaces - or the spaces
in between on the ground – that is, if the spectacle does not have absolute
control. On the ground in this case, means people enacting and practicing
policies of crises management that reject measures of social control. Guy
Debord imagined a resistance to modernity, or the society that created the
hyperrealism of the spectacle.58 This could take the form of a turnaround
from policies of modernity, which is one of the main drivers of unbounded
climate change in the first place.
The politics of crises are imaginaries that live in symbols, stories, images,
and discourses. These seem to have more power than science, at least in
terms of understanding expected human behavior as projected to
disruptions of climate change.59 This article does not suggest the science
about climate change as anthropogenic is apocalyptic; the stories told in
the body of interdisciplinary science are clear on this matter.60 Rather, the
point is chaos narratives are in opposition with a large body of
documented lived experience. The danger is these forms of knowing have
been, and can be further used, to justify policies built on domination.
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Anarchy fantasies as accepted fact in the politics of catastrophe can be
detrimental to socially just solutions. Policies of social control marginalize
those most subject to inequities of power.
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